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Note 
 
Warrantless Search Cases Are Really All the 
Same 
Will Stancil* 
Reading Fourth Amendment case law is a lot like watching 
a Law & Order marathon: by the second or third hour, all the 
storylines start to repeat themselves. Real-life police investiga-
tions, like police procedurals, tend to recycle and interchange 
key elements. A police dog sniffs a car;1 a radio beeper monitors 
a home.2 A police dog sniffs a home;3 a radio beeper monitors a 
car.4
                                                                                 
 *  JD/MPP Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota; MA 2008, Queens 
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 As a result, Fourth Amendment cases have a certain mix-
and-match quality, and after a while, careful observers might 
begin to notice that the old scenarios and new scenarios are 
built out of many of the same pieces. But Fourth Amendment 
cases often share another trait with cop shows: twist endings. 
The writers are always finding new ways to surprise, and even 
a minor change in the facts can flip established rules on their 
heads, generating outcomes that seem contrary to decades of 
 1. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406 (2005); City of Indianapolis 
v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34–35 (2000). 
 2. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708–10 (1984). 
 3. See Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 35 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. 
Ct. 995 (2012).  
 4. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277–78 (1983). 
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case law.5
When even inveterate observers are unable to predict a 
case’s outcome, the effects can be far-ranging. Without clear 
precedent to rely upon, trial judges struggle to consistently ap-
ply the Fourth Amendment to the variety of police actions be-
ing challenged in their courtrooms.
 The result is paradoxical: limited factual variation 
produces almost limitless doctrinal ambiguity.  
6 Likewise, the Fourth 
Amendment informs the actions of cops on the beat, who need 
to know what rules constrain their behavior.7 And at a time 
when both scholars and laymen alike have expressed concern 
over “the incredible shrinking Fourth Amendment,”8
Because the Supreme Court has always held that warrant-
less searches are presumptively unconstitutional, many Fourth 
Amendment claims revolve around the question of what consti-
tutes a search.
 elusive 
search and seizure rules do little to allay fears that privacy is 
being eroded. 
9 One major and often-overlooked source of 
Fourth Amendment ambiguity is the absence of any means of 
systematizing and comparing the various answers to this ques-
tion. Judges now generally rely on the standard described by 
Justice Harlan in Katz v. United States10
                                                                                 
 5. To use one recent example, after no fewer than three major Supreme 
Court cases holding that drug dogs were unique investigatory tools that did 
not trigger constitutional protections, Caballes, 543 U.S. at 405; Edmond, 531 
U.S. at 32; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), the Florida Supreme 
Court nonetheless found that use of a drug dog at a suspect’s residence created 
an unconstitutional search. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 55–56. 
: a search occurs when 
 6. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 
MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1470–71 (1985) (arguing that lower courts cannot consist-
ently apply the Fourth Amendment absent an explicit interpretative model). 
 7. See, e.g., David Rossman, Conditional Rules in Criminal Procedure: 
Alice in Wonderland Meets the Constitution, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 417, 466 
(2010) (“Much of the Court’s recent Fourth Amendment analysis is driven by 
its desire to make things simple for the police officers who have to translate 
their legal doctrine into action out on the street.”). 
 8. Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 
21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 257 (1984); jeffgolin, Comment to Jesse Ventura 
Sues TSA Over Body Scans, Pat Downs, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 
2011, 7:27 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/social/jeffgolin/jesse-ventura 
-sues-tsa-ov_n_813460_75090159.html (“The Incredible Shrinking Fourth 
Amendment! How we need it now.”). 
 9. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (“One might think that 
. . . examining the portion of a house that is in plain public view, while it is a 
search . . . is not an unreasonable one under the Fourth Amendment. But in 
fact we have held that visual observation is no search at all—perhaps in order 
to preserve somewhat more intact our doctrine that warrantless searches are 
presumptively unconstitutional.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 10. Id. at 32–33 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)). 
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police action violates a person’s reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.11 But this standard allows deciding courts to approach 
Fourth Amendment questions holistically, rather than address-
ing the component factual elements that make up a case.12
In order to make that distinction more straightforward, 
this Note proposes a new procedure for writing and organizing 
search and seizure jurisprudence. Part I examines case law to 
illustrate that courts following Katz have refused to systema-
tize Fourth Amendment precedent or integrate it into a worka-
ble schema. Part II then describes a model which classifies 
Fourth Amendment holdings by breaking them into two con-
ceptual elements: the subject of an investigation and the meth-
od of an investigation. It uses the model to explain how the de-
fective Katz standard encourages the corrosion of protections 
against warrantless searches. Finally, Part III suggests that 
courts adopt a more mechanical approach to search and seizure 
cases. It argues that law enforcement and the general public 
alike would be better served if courts abandoned judicial mini-
malism and holistic reasoning in favor of compartmentalized 
rulemaking. This Note concludes that an analytical framework 
which breaks Fourth Amendment searches into a limited set of 
conceptual components would promote judicial consistency and 
forestall the erosion of privacy protections. 
 Too 
often, these decisions leave the distinction between a reasona-
ble and unreasonable expectation of privacy bewilderingly 
ethereal.  
I.  A BRIEF AND TROUBLED HISTORY OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT   
The confusion currently surrounding warrantless searches 
and seizures may have been inevitable. The entire body of law 
is derived from one brief phrase in the Fourth Amendment: 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated . . . .”13
                                                                                 
 11. Id. at 33; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 Over a century of jurispru-
dential uncertainty has stemmed from warring interpretations 
of those twenty-four words.  
 12. See Note, The Fourth Amendment’s Third Way, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1627, 1636 (2007) (“The Katz test, by depending on factual particulars and ne-
cessitating the interpretation of ambiguous social norms, functions just like a 
traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test . . . .”). 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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 A. PRE-KATZ: THE PROPERTY RIGHTS ERA 
 Until the middle of the twentieth century, the Supreme 
Court maintained a narrow conception of the Fourth Amend-
ment’s protections, arguing that they were, in essence, a de-
fense against government abrogation of property rights.14 The 
logic behind this approach was clear: before the development of 
remote surveillance or communications devices, government 
agents were physically incapable of conducting a search with-
out trespassing into private property, whether by intruding in-
to a locked house, or surreptitiously opening a letter.15
The Court clung to a property rights interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment long after new technology had begun to 
threaten its usefulness. In Olmstead v. United States, it held 
that the Fourth Amendment did not protect telephone conver-
sations from government wiretapping at a remote location, be-
cause the conversation was travelling across lines in which the 
defendant maintained no property interest.
 This ear-
ly formulation of Fourth Amendment protections also eased the 
task of courts, which could answer the question of whether a 
search had occurred by simply determining whether a trespass 
had also occurred. 
16 Even in 1928, the 
intuitive wrongness of the Olmstead decision was apparent. 
The decision was “not well received” and backlash against it 
contributed to the passage of the Federal Communications Act, 
which outlawed wiretapping.17
Nonetheless, the Court doubled down on its interpretation, 
and over the following decades churned out elaborate rules 
about the bounds of proper police surveillance. For example, 
one line of cases determined that monitoring devices could be 
used if they were placed against the wall of a private resi-
 Clearly, the Court and the pub-
lic had very different ideas about the sort of government activi-
ty the Fourth Amendment should protect against.  
                                                                                 
 14. See Daniel Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 
1511, 1517–18 (2010). Property rights had not always been central to the 
Fourth Amendment; in the nineteenth century, the Court relied on other con-
ceptualizations of its protections. See generally Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth 
Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 978–90. 
 15. Solove, supra note 14, at 1517–18. 
 16. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928) (“The language of 
the amendment can not be extended and expanded to include telephone wires 
reaching to the whole world from the defendant’s house or office. The interven-
ing wires are not part of his house or office . . . .”), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 
at 347. 
 17. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 
247 (3d ed. 2009).  
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dence,18 but not if they were driven into the wall.19 To modern 
sensibilities, these distinctions may seem inane, but it is im-
portant to remember that they also arise from a formally co-
herent view of the Fourth Amendment. In the Court’s view, the 
conceptual area protected by the Amendment was clearly de-
fined: defendants could expect freedom from physical intrusion 
into certain private property and personal effects. Except to the 
extent they encroached into these sharply bounded subjects, 
the actions of police were irrelevant to the constitutional ques-
tion.20
B. KATZ AND AFTERMATH 
 But whatever theoretical clarity this interpretation lent 
to search and seizure jurisprudence, it seemed more and more a 
relic in an age when the government could use new technology 
to intrude into privacy without any sort of physical invasion. 
In 1967, the Supreme Court finally addressed the flaws in 
its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In Katz v. United States, 
the Court explicitly overruled Olmstead, stating bluntly that 
the Constitution “protects people, not places,” and that while 
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public” is not pro-
tected, “what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public,” is shielded from government eyes by 
the Fourth Amendment.21 Katz, in short, represented a para-
digm shift in Fourth Amendment law, swapping out the proper-
ty rights rationale for a privacy-based principle. Justice Har-
lan’s famous concurrence described an individual’s “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” as the lynchpin of this new regime,22 a 
formulation that has become shorthand for the Katz test.23
                                                                                 
 18. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135–36 (1942). 
  
 19. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511–12 (1961). 
 20. Other commentators have described these cases as focusing primarily 
on the actions of government agents. See, e.g., Ric Simmons, From Katz to 
Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Centu-
ry Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1308–09 (2002) (arguing that 
Olmstead and its progeny focused on the “method of search” of government 
agents). It is important, however, to distinguish between the facts discussed 
by the court and the interests the court is seeking to protect. The question of 
whether a protected subject had been impinged upon might turn entirely on 
the actions of government agents, conveying to the careless reader the impres-
sion that the actions of government agents are the central subject of inquiry. 
 21. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  
 22. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 23. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (“The touch-
stone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a ‘constitutional-
ly protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’” (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 
(Harlan, J., concurring))). 
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A voluminous amount of scholarly ink has been spilled 
documenting the many and varied difficulties posed by the Katz 
decision.24 But for the purposes of the following analysis, the 
most important problem is how Katz altered the interests un-
derlying the Fourth Amendment, and therefore changed the 
factual focus of interpreting courts. While the Katz court argu-
ably succeeded in realigning the effect and the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment, this change has come at the cost of clarity. 
The reasoning in Olmstead and its successors may have seemed 
formalistic, but it was a formalism enabled by clearly delineat-
ed, protected subject matter. By comparison, what does Katz 
protect (or protect against)? Nearly forty-five years after the 
decision, nobody can say for certain. In the words of one schol-
ar, “The reasonable expectation of privacy test is the central 
mystery of Fourth Amendment law . . . . [N]o one seems to 
know what makes an expectation of privacy constitutionally 
reasonable.”25 Olmstead notably disregarded the conduct of the 
law officer when determining whether the Fourth Amendment 
was implicated. But “reasonable expectations of privacy” might 
well refer to expectations about the behavior of government 
agents, as well as expectations that a certain subject matter 
will remain private.26
C. KATZ’S CONFUSING PROGENY  
 In this sense, the Katz test has length-
ened the list of factors that courts might take into account 
when deciding a Fourth Amendment case, without providing 
any guidance as to whether one concern should predominate. 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is still haunted by 
Katz’s omission of critical information about which specific fac-
tors to consider in warrantless search cases. A quick survey of 
notable post-Katz search and seizure cases, as well as a few ex-
tant theories of Fourth Amendment protection, reveals that 
concerns about doctrinal ambiguity are well-founded. 
                                                                                 
 24. For a brief catalogue of some of the most common complaints, see Jed 
Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 105–15 (2008).  
 25. Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 503, 504 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26. But see Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211 (describing the Katz test as address-
ing “expectation[s] of privacy in the object of a challenged search” (emphasis 
added)); Simmons, supra note 20, at 1305–06 (arguing that Katz was intended 
to exclude the method of search from Fourth Amendment analyses altogether). 
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1. Kyllo, Caballes, and Bond  
Kyllo v. United States27 is one of the most well-known re-
cent search and seizure decisions. Because the case revolved 
around the use of an advanced thermal imaging device to in-
vestigate a private home, it is commonly cited as a landmark 
decision regulating new surveillance technologies.28 The Kyllo 
holding, however, actually indicates very little of the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning. While Justice Scalia, writing for the majori-
ty, held the search unconstitutional,29 he failed to identify with 
particularity the fact or facts that violated the Fourth Amend-
ment. Instead, he declared that when “[g]overnment uses a de-
vice that is not in general public use, to explore details of the 
home that would previously have been unknowable without 
physical intrusion, the surveillance . . . is presumptively unrea-
sonable without a warrant.”30
In Illinois v. Caballes, the Supreme Court held that the use 
of a drug dog during an otherwise lawful traffic stop did not 
run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.
 This language suggests that the 
Court took both the subject of the search (the interior of a pri-
vate home) and the officer’s method of conducting the search (a 
heat-sensing device) into account when making its decision; it 
provides little guidance as to how the decision might have dif-
fered if the facts had varied along one of these two dimensions.  
31 The Court explicitly rec-
onciled its decision with Kyllo, noting that while a dog might be 
analogous to a heat sensor, in the earlier case the “device was 
capable of detecting lawful activity.”32 The Court explained that 
“[t]he legitimate expectation that information about perfectly 
lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguish-
able from . . . expectations concerning the nondetection of con-
traband in the trunk of [one’s] car.”33 It concluded that a dog 
search only reveals “a substance that no individual has any 
right to possess” and therefore does not trigger constitutional 
protections.34
                                                                                 
 27. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 Oddly, the rationale behind the Caballes drug-dog 
 28. See, e.g., Amy Miller, Note, Kyllo v. United States: New Law Enforce-
ment Technologies and the Fourth Amendment, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 181, 182 
(2002) (“The Supreme Court’s holding in Kyllo will implicate other sense-
enhancing technologies by necessity . . . .”). 
 29. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 405 (2005). 
 32. Id. at 409.  
 33. Id. at 410. 
 34. Id.  
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rule mirrors the reasoning of Olmstead: by effectively refusing 
to extend the question of constitutional protection beyond the 
nature of the search’s subject, the Court necessarily remains 
agnostic about the actual conduct of the government officers.  
Other cases, however, demonstrate that the conduct of a 
government agent can be determinative in a Fourth Amend-
ment challenge, even when the subject of a search does not nec-
essarily raise privacy concerns. In Bond v. United States, a po-
lice officer felt around the outer layer of a bag, searching for the 
shape of contraband.35 Although the Court conceded that a 
member of the public could have moved or handled the bag, it 
upheld the defendant’s constitutional challenge, noting that the 
“physically invasive inspection” was itself especially intrusive 
and could not be reasonably expected.36 Notably, its analysis 
never touched on whether the bag’s owner could have reasona-
bly expected the contents of the bag to remain private even 
from other, less intrusive searches.37 A recent Florida Supreme 
Court decision, Jardines v. State, took a similar approach.38 In 
Jardines, police conducted a search of the outside of a private 
residence with a drug dog.39 Although none of the constituent 
elements of the search seemed to rise to the level of a constitu-
tional violation, the court held for the defendant on the grounds 
that the search method “entail[ed] a degree of public opprobri-
um, humiliation and embarrassment.”40 Once again, the analy-
sis focused on the conduct of government agents instead of the 
subject of the search.41
2. The Third-Party and Public Exposure Doctrines 
 
In addition to simple factual holdings like those described 
in the cases above, a handful of more elaborate theories of 
Fourth Amendment protection have been adopted by the 
courts. Although they sometimes seem to overlap or conflict 
with each other, and are not consistently applied, scholars have 
                                                                                 
 35. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 335–36 (2000). 
 36. Id. at 337–39. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995 
(2012).  
 39. Id. at 37–39. 
 40. Id. at 48. 
 41. See id. at 45–49 (discussing the conduct of government agents when 
performing dog “sniff tests”). 
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recognized several such doctrines emerging in the wake of 
Katz.42
One of the most-criticized variations of Fourth Amendment 
law is the so-called “risk assumption theory” or “third-party 
doctrine.”
  
43 This doctrine is sometimes evoked when a govern-
ment search recovers information that the defendant had will-
ingly transferred to a third party. The information can take a 
variety of forms: a conversation with a secret prison snitch,44 
financial records conveyed to a bank,45 or even a dialed tele-
phone number (necessarily transmitted to a phone company in 
order to complete the call).46 The Supreme Court has reasoned 
that the defendant, “in revealing his affairs to another, [as-
sumes the risk] that the information will be conveyed by that 
person to the Government.”47 Importantly, the mere possibility 
of third party conveyance may sometimes defeat a defendant’s 
expectation of privacy—even if the government actually ob-
tained the information through more sophisticated (and more 
unexpected) means. For instance, in United States v. White, a 
police informant talked to a defendant while wearing a hidden 
microphone and recorder.48 The Court held that the defendant 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversation, 
because the informant could have written it down from 
memory; the recordings were admitted into evidence.49
A similar vein of logic underlies the “public exposure” doc-
trine.
  
50
                                                                                 
 42. For an overview of the two theories described in this Note, see, for ex-
ample, Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of 
the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 
39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647, 667–76 (1988) (critiquing the “risk assumption” and 
“public exposure” models of constitutional protection). 
 Relying on Katz’s pronouncement that “[w]hat a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, 
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection,” some courts 
have thrown out challenges on the basis that the defendant 
took insufficient precautions to protect private information 
 43. See, e.g., id. at 667–76; Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party 
Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 570–73 (2009) (cataloguing common scholarly 
critiques of the third-party doctrine). 
 44. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 746–47 (1971). 
 45. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437–39 (1976). 
 46. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737–38 (1979). 
 47. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
 48. White, 401 U.S. at 746–47.  
 49. Id. at 751–52.  
 50. See, e.g., Gutterman, supra note 42, at 673–76.  
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from the public.51 In California v. Greenwood, police snooped 
through the contents of opaque garbage bags the defendants 
had placed on the curbside for disposal.52 Although the Su-
preme Court conceded that members of the public were unlike-
ly to inspect the defendants’ garbage, it nonetheless held that 
no constitutional violation occurred, reasoning that the bags 
had been theoretically accessible to the public.53 The public ex-
posure rule focuses on where a defendant may reasonably ex-
pect the public to go, not where a member of the public is legal-
ly permitted to go. For example, one offshoot of the public 
exposure rule—the “open fields” doctrine—explicitly disclaims 
any expectation of privacy in open outdoor areas, even when 
those areas cannot be observed without crossing into clearly 
marked private property.54
3. United States v. Jones 
  
One recent case seems destined to shake up Fourth 
Amendment doctrine even further, though its full implications 
have yet to be felt. In United States v. Jones, the courts 
addressed the warrantless installation of a GPS tracking device 
on a suspect’s car.55 The tracking device was left in operation 
for weeks, continuously monitoring the suspect’s movements 
over that span.56 Although previous decisions had held that the 
Fourth Amendment could not protect publicly observable 
automotive travel57—an approach that comports well with the 
“public exposure” doctrine described above—the D.C. Circuit 
court in Jones avoided that precedent by reframing the facts.58
                                                                                 
 51. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 
It differentiated public travel in the short term from the 
 52. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37–38 (1988). 
 53. Id. at 39–41. 
 54. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (“[A]s a practical 
matter these lands usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways 
that a home, an office, or commercial structure would not be. It is not general-
ly true that fences or “No Trespassing” signs effectively bar the public from 
viewing open fields in rural areas.”). 
 55. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–86 (1983). 
 58. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 557 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d 
sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945 (“Knotts held only that ‘[a] person traveling 
in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in his movements from one place to another, not that such a person has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements whatsoever, world 
without end . . . .’” (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281)). 
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aggregate of all travel over a prolonged period, and extended 
Fourth Amendment protection to the latter subject.59
While the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s 
judgment, it appears to have partially abandoned its ra-
tionale.
 
60 Instead, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 
adopted a trespass-based approach evocative of the Olmstead-
era property rights regime.61 Scalia maintained that the sus-
pect’s car was, as a personal “effect,” an explicitly protected 
subject of the Fourth Amendment; the placement of the track-
ing device on the car therefore constituted an impermissible 
trespass against private property.62 Confusingly, the opinion 
never firmly establishes whether trespasses are unreasonable 
under the Katz rubric, or if Scalia believes that the property-
based conception of the Fourth Amendment is a separate 
strand of law coexisting with Katz.63 Adding to the jumble, at 
least five concurring justices seem to argue that long-term GPS 
monitoring would be unconstitutional—though they seem split 
on whether the problem is the duration or the use of GPS.64
Even this small selection of cases and theories reveals dis-
agreement and confusion over the interests that the Fourth 
Amendment seeks to protect. But the confusion gets much 
worse when the precedential effect of the decisions is consid-
ered.  
 
                                                                                 
 59. Id. at 561–64. 
 60. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (asserting that Jones “does not require [the 
Court] to answer” whether GPS tracking is unconstitutional). 
 61. Id. at 951 (“Katz . . . established that property rights are not the sole 
measure of Fourth Amendment violations, but did not snuff out the previously 
recognized protection for property.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 62. Id. at 950. 
 63. The opinion provides support for both conceptions. Scalia argues that 
“Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formula-
tion,” that “Katz did not repudiate that [property-based] understanding” of the 
Amendment, and that the “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been 
added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.” Id. at 950, 
952. But he also describes how expectations about property rights are embed-
ded within reasonable expectations of privacy, suggesting that Katz still an-
chors Fourth Amendment law. Id. at 951 (“We have embodied that preserva-
tion of past rights in our very definition of ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ 
which we have said to be an expectation ‘that has a source outside of the 
Fourth Amendment . . . by reference to concepts of real or personal property 
law . . . .’” (citation omitted)). 
 64. Id. at 954–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957–64 (Alito, J., con-
curring, joined by Ginsburg, J., Breyer, J., and Kagan, J.).  
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D. THE FAILURE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PRECEDENT 
Many scholars have expressed concern that Katz and mod-
ern Fourth Amendment doctrine will allow new technology to 
erode traditional boundaries of privacy from government intru-
sion.65
The problem is most visible in the lower courts. Consider 
Coffin v. Brandau, an unremarkable Fourth Amendment case 
decided in the Eleventh Circuit during the spring of 2011.
 But the simple truth is that, under Katz, those bounda-
ries were never very clear in the first place. The forward-
looking focus on technology obscures an even more fundamen-
tal weakness of Fourth Amendment doctrine: the inability of 
courts and scholars to consistently interpret prior decisions. 
This defect frustrates not only attempts to control the use of 
sophisticated GPS trackers and thermal imaging devices, but 
also attempts to prevent rudimentary police rummaging of the 
sort that has existed for centuries. 
66 In 
Coffin, the court spent a significant portion of its decision de-
termining whether government agents violated the Fourth 
Amendment by entering an open garage to knock on an interior 
door to a home.67 After discussing at length three earlier cases 
in which entry into a garage had been deemed an unconstitu-
tional search, the court nonetheless decided that prior Fourth 
Amendment decisions provide no clear rule regarding the con-
stitutional status of attached garages.68 Although the court 
eventually determined that the Fourth Amendment was indeed 
violated, it relied on an ambiguous “totality of the circumstanc-
es” test to reach its holding.69
                                                                                 
 65. See, e.g., Adam W. Brill, Note, Kyllo v. United States: Is the Court’s 
Bright-Line Rule on Thermal Imaging Written in Disappearing Ink?, 56 ARK. 
L. REV. 431, 454 (2003) (“Regardless of how future courts address this issue, 
technology remains an inherent threat to the sanctity of the home.”); Jeffrey 
W. Childers, Comment, Kyllo v. United States: A Temporary Reprieve from 
Technology-Enhanced Surveillance of the Home, 81 N.C. L. REV. 728, 762 
(2003) (“[A]t best Kyllo offers a temporary reprieve from the governmental in-
trusion of technology-enhanced surveillance.”). 
  
 66. Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 2011). Although Coffin was 
picked at random for the purpose of illustration, it exemplifies many of the 
problems this Note seeks to discuss. This is no great coincidence. The concep-
tual uncertainties that plague Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are deeply 
rooted, and manifest themselves equally in cases related to garage doors, drug 
dogs, third-party informants, and other common search and seizure questions. 
 67. Id. at 1009–13. 
 68. Id. at 1011 (discussing Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932); 
United States v. Sokolow, 450 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1971); Kauz v. United States, 
95 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1938)).  
 69. Id. at 1012. 
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Tellingly, the officers in Coffin successfully raised a quali-
fied immunity defense, because there was no constitutional rule 
that “with obvious clarity” forbade them from entering the gar-
age.70 The court drily noted that few Fourth Amendment cases 
will ever meet the “obvious clarity” standard, because the “ex-
pectation of privacy context is inherently fact-specific, thus not 
lending itself to clearly established law.”71
Coffin and the other post-Katz decisions reveal a Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence that is failing in several directions 
at once. Search and seizure rules are difficult to predict, and 
difficult to interpret. They force valuable judicial resources to 
be spent pursuing minor factual questions. They are too fluid to 
provide much comfort to private individuals, and too fact-
specific to provide guidance to police officers. 
 
II.  THE MECHANICS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW   
For decades, legal scholars have hoped to bring some 
measure of order to the chaos surrounding the Fourth Amend-
ment. Countless law review articles have attempted to build 
models that reconcile the contradictions in search and seizure 
jurisprudence.72 A great many of these models begin with a 
search for first principles; they cast about for the one legal the-
ory (or the small set of theories) that can unify the many cases 
that make up Fourth Amendment doctrine.73
                                                                                 
 70. Id. at 1014–15 (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 
(1997)). 
 As Orin Kerr has 
astutely observed, these efforts are all doomed to at least par-
tial failure: “With so many decided cases and so few agreed-
upon principles at work, trying to understand the Fourth 
Amendment is a bit like trying to put together a jigsaw puzzle 
 71. Id. at 1015.  
 72. See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 14, at 978 (describing five separate mod-
els of reasonableness used by the Court and proposing a unified objective mod-
el of reasonableness); Kerr, supra note 25, at 508 (“There are four different 
models of Fourth Amendment protection–four relatively distinct categories of 
argument used to justify whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.”); 
Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief 
of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 384 (1988) (redefining the concept 
of reasonableness to “reflect the [Fourth] [A]mendment’s underlying values 
and purposes”). 
 73. For an article that demonstrates both the appeal and the limitations 
of this approach, see generally Gutterman, supra note 42 (depicting pre- and 
post-Katz tensions in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as the interplay be-
tween competing values-based and means-based interpretations of limitations 
on government power).  
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with several incorrect pieces: no matter which way you try to 
assemble it, a few pieces won’t fit.”74
This Note also proposes a model to help deconstruct the 
Fourth Amendment, but it is a model with a somewhat differ-
ent focus than most. At least initially, it discards the question 
of first principles. Instead, it categorizes Fourth Amendment 
decisions by their practical meaning. In doing so, it views each 
Fourth Amendment decision as, first and foremost, the result of 
a collection of intertwining rules—for instance, a rule that al-
lows police to use dogs to sniff out drugs, or a rule that forbids 
warrantless entry into a home—and asks how best to parse out 
those rules from the complex factual patterns presented by the 
case. 
  
The proposed model does not attempt to deconstruct the 
social or practical values that form the basis for these rules. In-
stead, it focuses as much as possible on the mechanical and log-
ical structure of the rules, and how best to describe their inter-
actions with each other and with the Fourth Amendment’s 
theoretical framework. In doing so, it seeks to create a descrip-
tive taxonomy that can be applied to multiple strands of Fourth 
Amendment analysis.  
Once its groundwork is laid, this model can be expanded to 
predict the precedential effect of particular Fourth Amendment 
holdings. It explains why rules that expand the scope of the 
constitutional protections may be less robust and influential 
than rules that limit protections. Finally, the model suggests at 
least one pathway out of the legal cul-de-sac that is the Katz 
regime. 
A. THE UNIVERSAL STRUCTURE OF SEARCHES 
At first glance, the endless variety of searches that could 
potentially fall under the Fourth Amendment’s purview may 
seem to have nothing in common. But that initial perception is 
not quite correct. All Fourth Amendment searches—in fact, all 
searches of any kind—share a common conceptual structure. So 
far, this Note has only hinted at those shared features; in order 
to proceed any further, they must now be described in detail.  
All searches contain two distinct elements: a passive, pro-
tected subject and an active method of investigation. These are 
the two basic components from which the concept of a “search” 
is formed. Taken alone, the mere presence of each element in a 
                                                                                 
 74. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Consti-
tutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809 (2004). 
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fact pattern does not have any predictive power; indeed, both 
are always present in every Fourth Amendment case, whatever 
the outcome. Without them, there could be no cognizable 
Fourth Amendment question at all. The key feature of this 
Note’s proposed model is its bifurcation of all Fourth Amend-
ment fact patterns into these two components. Each component 
has unique properties that distinguish it from the other. 
First, all searches begin with a protected subject of some 
description. In this definition, both the words “protected” and 
“subject” must be given their broadest possible meanings. The 
subject could be a physical space,75 a private fact,76 or some arti-
ficial category of information, such as the aggregate of an indi-
vidual’s movements over time.77 And the subject might be af-
forded its protection by both tangible barriers (fences, 
geographic remoteness, or computer security)78 and intangible 
ideas (public warnings, social norms, or even just a person’s un-
founded belief that a certain subject will remain unknown to 
the government).79
The second component of a search is the method by which 
it was undertaken. When a search occurs, the protected subject 
suffers some intrusion. The combined set of actions, devices, 
techniques, and procedures used to effect the intrusion com-
prise the method of the search. Once again, this component 
 The protected subject can be described as 
the set of features or facts that existed prior to any investigato-
ry action. Without a subject, there can be no search, but only 
government action targeted at nothing, affecting nobody.  
                                                                                 
 75. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180–81 (1984) (discuss-
ing the distinction between “open fields” and a dwelling’s “curtilage” for 
Fourth Amendment purposes). 
 76. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976) (denying 
challenge to government collection of bank records). 
 77. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560–61 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(suggesting that the “whole may be more revealing than the parts”), aff’d sub 
nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 78. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986) (“Police were 
unable to observe the contents of respondent’s yard from ground level because 
of a 6-foot outer fence and a 10-foot inner fence completely enclosing the 
yard.”); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 174 (“[T]he court noted that the field itself is highly 
secluded: it is bounded on all sides by woods, fences, and embankments and 
cannot be seen from any point of public access.”); United States v. Andrus, 483 
F.3d 711, 721 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[Defendant] argues his computer’s password 
protection indicated his computer was ‘locked’ to third parties . . . .”). 
 79. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211 (“Respondent contends he has done all 
that can reasonably be expected to tell the world he wishes to maintain the 
privacy of his garden . . . . [H]e asserts he has not ‘knowingly’ exposed himself 
to aerial views.”); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173 (“He had posted ‘No Trespassing’ 
signs at regular intervals . . . .”). 
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must be defined as broadly as possible. It includes any and all 
government action, even if that action has not traditionally 
been seen as an investigative technique giving rise to constitu-
tional protections. Without a method of investigation, there can 
also be no search. 
Importantly, while the two components are distinct, they 
cannot be fully disconnected. Neither element can be described 
in isolation without omitting important information about the 
search as a whole. The breadth of the intrusion into a particu-
lar subject depends largely on the method of investigation (re-
call Olmstead’s wiretaps, which uncovered private phone con-
versations but left private property untouched).80 Similarly, the 
nature of an investigatory method may depend on how the sub-
ject of an investigation is defined.81
Because both subject and method are conceptual character-
izations of a physical action, a single real-life search can usual-
ly be described as having multiple subjects and methods. For 
instance, if the government intercepts a sealed doctor’s note, 
the subject of its search might be described both as a letter, and 
as private medical information. Either possibility (or both!) 
may have constitutional consequences. A high-profile example 
of this dynamic occurred in the recent Jones case, where the 
circuit court and Supreme Court portrayed the subject and 
method of the search differently.
  
82 While the circuit court de-
scribed a GPS search of the suspect’s aggregated movements,83 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion employed a different charac-
terization: “It is important to be clear about what occurred in 
this case: The Government physically occupied private property 
for the purpose of obtaining information.”84
                                                                                 
 80. See supra note 
 All discussions of 
constitutionality aside, the important thing to note here is that 
both descriptions are correct. The search method involved both 
GPS and a physical trespass, and the subject was both private 
property and the suspect’s aggregated travel. 
16 and accompanying text. 
 81. One recent example of this relationship can be seen in Maynard, 615 
F.3d at 556. In Maynard, the court rejected the government’s contention that 
GPS tracking was functionally identical to earlier forms of monitoring a sus-
pect’s movement, noting that GPS trackers could monitor movements over a 
longer period of time than earlier technologies. By broadening the subject of 
the search to include a larger timeframe, the court reframed the method used. 
 82. Compare Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945, with Maynard, 615 F.3d at 544. 
 83. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563. 
 84. Jones, 132 S. Ct at 949. 
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These observations can be generalized even further, and 
developed into a basic conceptual structure for all real-life 
searches. As with Jones above, any event constituting a search 
can be perceived as utilizing many different methods, and tar-
geting many different subjects. Each subject can then be paired 
off with each and every method, and the sum total of possible 
pairings represents all the conceivable ways the search might 
be described. For example, using Jones’s two methods and two 
subjects, four pairings are possible: (1) GPS and private proper-
ty, (2) GPS and aggregated movement, (3) physical trespass 
and aggregated movement, and (4) physical trespass and pri-
vate property. (Common sense suggests that most searches will 
have more than four possible pairings, however.) For a court to 
reject any search, one or more of the constituent pairings must 
prove offensive to the Fourth Amendment. In theory, all Fourth 
Amendment rules can be reduced to two independent variables, 
and a third dependent variable: a subject and a method, and a 
corresponding determination of the search’s overall constitu-
tionality or unconstitutionality.  
This model describes search and seizure rules at the high-
est level of abstraction, but causes major practical difficulties. 
It is an inefficient and unnatural way of creating usable legal 
principles because it requires an individual determination for 
each and every conceivable variation of subject and method—
an effectively infinite number of possible combinations. In order 
to surmount this obstacle, courts utilize decision principles—
what we popularly conceive as Fourth Amendment rules. These 
can take many forms. For instance, under the Olmstead princi-
ple, any constituent pairing which did not include some form of 
private property as the subject was deemed constitutional.85 
Kyllo suggests that any pairing with the interior of a house as 
the subject is probably unconstitutional.86 The third-party rule 
excludes from protection any pairing in which the subject was 
revealed to a third party.87
While somewhat ancillary to the remainder of the discus-
sion, this model is still important. It describes, in the most 
basic terms, the challenge courts face when they make Fourth 
Amendment rules, and when they interpret Fourth Amend-
 And so on. 
                                                                                 
 85. See Simmons, supra note 20, at 1309.  
 86. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
 87. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held 
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of in-
formation revealed to a third person and conveyed by him to Government au-
thorities . . . .”); see supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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ment precedent. Many of the difficulties posed arise directly 
from the process laid out above: the need to somehow transform 
discrete conceptualizations of individual fact patterns into 
broad rules that can be applied in many different circumstanc-
es. 
B. THE ROLE OF SUBJECT AND METHOD IN FOURTH 
AMENDMENT CASES 
All Fourth Amendment rules (and therefore, cases) neces-
sarily collapse into two independent questions: Is the subject of 
the search acceptable? Is the method of the search acceptable? 
This principle is difficult to prove conclusively, but simple 
to illustrate with a very straightforward hypothetical. Imagine 
a police officer peeping through the keyhole of a locked house. 
One could imagine any number of reasons why this action 
might prove unconstitutional. The house may be a specially 
protected area, and any government entry into it might violate 
the Fourth Amendment.88 Alternatively, keyhole spying might 
be so fundamentally unreasonable a method of information 
gathering that the search is automatically unconstitutional.89 A 
court might decide that, because a house is locked, the owner 
has manifested a subjective desire for privacy in that space 
that ought to be recognized and protected.90 Or a court might 
find that the house being locked leaves it shielded against any 
otherwise appropriate method of observation—but that would 
first require a determination of which methods are and are not 
appropriate.91
This brief hypothetical demonstrates two ideas. First, it 
shows how quickly the complexity of Fourth Amendment rea-
  
                                                                                 
 88. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.”). 
 89. This might be analogous to the “physically invasive inspection” in 
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000). There, the Court found that 
tactile manipulations were significantly more intrusive than visual searches 
or light frisks, and so an agent’s probing of a passenger’s bag on a bus was in-
herently unconstitutional. Id. 
 90. Cf. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (“By placing per-
sonal effects inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents manifested an ex-
pectation that the contents would remain free from public examination.”); 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (“[W]hat [a person] seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitu-
tionally protected.”).  
 91. Cf. State v. Smith, 181 A.2d 761, 769 (N.J. 1962) (“Peering through a 
window or a crack in a door or a keyhole is not, in the abstract, genteel behav-
ior, but the Fourth Amendment does not protect against all conduct unworthy 
of a good neighbor.”).  
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soning can grow, as straightforward, values-based determina-
tions are replaced by more complex inquiries. Second, it sug-
gests the way in which, no matter how complex its reasoning 
gets, the court ultimately must evaluate the facts along the two 
basic dimensions described above. In a sense, search and sei-
zure fact patterns can be reduced to two binary variables, each 
of which can be addressed independently of the other.  
Of course, breaking all the features of a Fourth Amend-
ment case into two mutually exclusive variables is of little use, 
absent some guidance on what those variables mean and how 
they interrelate. The subject/method model does not make any 
assumptions about the relative importance of one variable over 
another; instead, it relies on case law and precedent to deter-
mine which features of a search are important and which are 
not. In theory, Fourth Amendment case law should provide a 
set of instructions that helps judges and police officers inte-
grate the two independent components. So far, there are three 
great unknowns in the model, all of which should be resolved 
by precedent: first, how do you determine which subjects are 
protected? Second, how do you determine what methods are al-
lowable? Third, what is the relationship between the two varia-
bles?  
Olmstead’s school of property-based Fourth Amendment 
rights illustrates how case law can provide answers to all three 
of these questions.92 Under the Olmstead regime, subjects in 
which the defendant had a property right were protected.93 Any 
method that intruded upon those property rights was pro-
scribed.94 And the relationship was hierarchical, with the 
boundaries of the protected area determining the limits of po-
lice action.95
That same analytical lens, when turned on Katz and its 
progeny, quickly reveals the conceptual chaos that defines 
modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Katz’s privacy-
based system can answer none of the three questions that 
Olmstead addressed so straightforwardly.
  
96
                                                                                 
 92. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928), overruled by 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 347. 
 Under Katz, the 
answer is always the same: a search is unconstitutional when it 
runs afoul of “expectation[s] of privacy . . . that society is pre-
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 96. See The Fourth Amendment’s Third Way, supra note 12, at 1636. 
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pared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”97
It is little surprise that this absence of specifics has given 
birth to all manner of competing interpretations and seeming 
contradictions. Receiving so little direction on the fundamental 
questions raised by the Fourth Amendment, courts have been 
forced to simply make up rules as they go. The correct tech-
nique for determining whether the method or subject of a 
search is unconstitutional has drifted about, as courts have 
wrestled to fit the confusing precedent together. So in Caballes, 
the dog sniff case, the Court seems to ignore the method of in-
vestigation altogether, instead basing its entire analysis on an 
evaluation of the protectedness of the subject (in this case, con-
traband).
 Presumably, this formula-
tion applies equally to the component elements of a search, so 
that a subject is protected if it attracts reasonable expectations 
of privacy, and a method is proscribed if it violates reasonable 
expectations of privacy. The relationship between the two vari-
ables remains undefined. 
98 In Bond, the bag handling case, the Court avoided 
any discussion of the degree to which bags were subject to 
Fourth Amendment protection, grounding its decision in the 
unforeseeably intrusive method used by the police officer.99 
Jardines also focused heavily on police conduct, reserving 
harsh words for the unnecessarily embarrassing method with 
which officers carried out a dog sniff.100
More complex manifestations of modern Fourth Amend-
ment case law—for example, the “assumption of risk” and “pub-
lic exposure” theories—land somewhere between Olmstead and 
Katz in terms of providing helpful guidance. Like Olmstead, 
these doctrines supply principles for evaluating the constitu-
tionality of a search’s components, and help pin down the rela-
tionship between the search’s subject and method. But because 
they are only part of the perplexing collection of rules that de-
fines the Katz regime, they are haunted by uncertainty about 
the scope of their application.  
  
                                                                                 
 97. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 98. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–09 (2005). 
 99. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000). Although the 
Court noted that “[a] travelers’ personal luggage is clearly an ‘effect’ protected 
by the Amendment,” in doing so it only allowed for the possibility of Fourth 
Amendment protection of personal luggage, rather than suggesting that the 
subject’s characteristics were in any way dispositive in the case. Id. at 336. 
 100. See Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 48 (Fla. 2011) (“[S]uch dramatic 
government activity in the eyes of many-neighbors, passers-by, and the public 
at large-will be viewed as an official accusation of crime.”). 
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The “assumption of risk” analysis focuses on the subject 
variable. It primarily functions as a procedure for determining 
whether a subject can receive constitutional protection. It pro-
vides a criterion for making that determination: did the de-
fendant intentionally communicate the subject to a third par-
ty?101 If so, the subject receives no protection. The deciding 
court might then address the “method” variable separately. Al-
ternatively, it might hold, as in White, that the Constitution 
does not provide protection from methods of investigation that 
only uncover what could have been revealed by the third par-
ty.102
The public exposure doctrine takes a parallel form. Al-
though the rule is most often stated in terms of a search’s sub-
ject—i.e., subjects are not protected if a defendant takes inade-
quate precautions to protect them from the public’s eyes
 
103—the 
doctrine actually asks the court to make a determination about 
different methods of search. In order to decide whether a de-
fendant took reasonable precautions, a court must first decide 
what methods of observation could be reasonably expected from 
the public. (For instance, the public might ignore a “No Tres-
passing” sign,104 but probably would not be scanning houses 
with heat sensors.)105
Here again, as in the cases described above, the complicat-
ed doctrinal questions facing courts collapse into a straightfor-
ward, factual, and somewhat arbitrary assessment of the 
search’s subject or method. While case law describes any num-
ber of winding paths towards a Fourth Amendment holding—
some better marked than others—all of these paths require 
courts to eventually reckon with the two fundamental features 
of every search.  
 
C. THE SUBJECT/METHOD MODEL AND PRECEDENT 
Katz’s lack of theoretical clarity could be excused if courts 
offered a strong system of precedent-based rules as an alterna-
tive. Instead of relying on a strong, predictable set of principles, 
trial courts and police officers could consult an extensive, well-
                                                                                 
 101. Gutterman, supra note 42, at 667–68 (discussing the assumption of 
risk analysis).  
 102. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 746–47 (1971). 
 103. Gutterman, supra note 42, at 672–75 (discussing the public exposure 
doctrine after Katz). 
 104. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984). 
 105. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (describing a heat sen-
sor as a “device . . . not in general public use”). 
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defined set of search and seizure rules. Although the rationales 
for these rules might be fuzzy, their universal applicability 
could, at least, provide guidelines with which private citizens 
and law enforcement could protect themselves. 
Unfortunately, Katz seriously frustrates efforts to create a 
working body of precedent. The fundamental problem is simple: 
because courts often do not appreciate or answer the full, two-
dimensional question raised by search and seizure cases, even 
well-known Fourth Amendment fact patterns are often func-
tionally devoid of concrete information. These famous cases—
and their less-famous peers—provide little guidance to inter-
preting courts. Worse still, the problem is asymmetric. Factual 
features that do not raise constitutional issues can be described 
with considerable specificity, while features that do implicate 
the Fourth Amendment remain hidden behind a fog of interpre-
tative ambiguity. This dynamic creates straightforward excep-
tions to the warrant requirement, but few equivalently 
straightforward rules proscribing government conduct. As a re-
sult, the number of allowable searches available to the govern-
ment has increased over time, without strong, simple bounda-
ries or protections to act as counterweights.  
The asymmetry created in Fourth Amendment precedent is 
a consequence of the vagueness of the Katz “reasonable expec-
tation of privacy” test. There are multiple routes by which a 
court might reach the holding that a search was in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment; broadly speaking, a search might vio-
late expectations of privacy related to a particular subject or a 
particular method of search. But there is only one route to find-
ing that no violation occurred at all: none of the facts of the 
search were sufficient to create a constitutional problem. This 
dynamic is illustrated in the table below.  
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Table 1 
Subject Method Search is . . . 
Unreasonable Unreasonable Unconstitutional 
Unreasonable Reasonable Unconstitutional 
Reasonable Unreasonable Unconstitutional 
Reasonable Reasonable Unconstitutional106
Reasonable 
 
Reasonable Constitutional 
Table 1: The constitutional status of the elements of the underlying 
search can only be predicted if the search is itself held to be constitu-
tional. Without additional information, the four shaded unconstitu-
tional scenarios are indistinguishable to an outside observer. 
 
The logic of Katz, however, does not require courts to re-
port which particular element of a search violated reasonable 
expectations of privacy; instead, decisions are often decided by 
“the facts of the case”107 or based in “the totality of the circum-
stances.”108
1. A Demonstration of How Katz Precedent Fails 
 If, at a later date, another court wishes to use the 
earlier decision as guidance, the only useful pieces of infor-
mation available are the facts of the case and the holding itself. 
But because the holding could have arisen from more than one 
fact, no clearly defined rule can be parsed out of the earlier de-
cision.  
The problem is perhaps most easily illustrated with a hy-
pothetical. Imagine that a police helicopter, flying low and slow 
through a residential subdivision, spies a neighborhood bully 
conducting a drug deal inside his backyard treehouse. The bul-
ly is arrested and convicted, and he appeals his conviction on 
Fourth Amendment grounds.  
                                                                                 
 106. This row represents the possibility of a sui generis holding—a search 
that is unconstitutional only because of the unique interaction of an otherwise-
acceptable subject and method. Katz, after all, does not force courts to find a 
search constitutional simply because the court believes all of the search’s un-
derlying elements are constitutional when they are viewed in isolation.  
 107. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 557 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing 
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983)), aff’d sub nom. United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. United 
States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5 (1986) (“Fourth Amendment cases must be de-
cided on the facts of each case, not by extravagant generalizations.”). 
 108. See, e.g., Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1012 (11th Cir. 2011) (“We 
hold . . . under the totality of the circumstances, the Deputies’ entry . . . was a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
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First, assume that the circuit court upholds the challenge, 
citing Katz. The decision is brief, and merely notes that, on the 
facts of the case, the defendant’s reasonable expectations of 
privacy have been violated. Later that year, the police arrest 
the same defendant for conducting a drug deal in the same 
treehouse. This time, however, the police are cautious to use a 
clearly permissible method of observation and watch the 
treehouse from a public street. When a second constitutional 
challenge is raised, the trial court looks to the earlier case in 
order to decide the only extant issue: whether treehouses re-
ceive Fourth Amendment protection.  
As it turns out, the earlier case provides no help. This is 
because the circuit court, following Katz, never made clear the 
true basis of its decision. It never said whether the treehouse 
received special constitutional protection from prying eyes, or if 
the Constitution simply forbade police observation from low-
flying helicopters. Unfortunately, the choice between these two 
rationales might prove determinative. The trial court is forced 
to relitigate the issue as a question of first impression. 
Now, assume instead that the circuit court rejected the ini-
tial challenge, albeit with a similarly thin explanation. Sudden-
ly, however, the second case becomes simple to resolve. Because 
the first search did not trigger constitutional protections, it fol-
lows that no component of that search, standing alone, could 
have been sufficient to trigger constitutional protections. The 
district court throws out the challenge, confident that it has 
correctly interpreted existing case law.  
2. Where Katz Precedent Already Has Failed 
This is not a fanciful hypothetical. Instead, it describes the 
exact problem that faced the Coffin court, which was similarly 
frustrated in its attempts to consult case precedent.109 Unable 
to determine whether attached garages have special constitu-
tional protection of the sort that has been given to houses—in 
other words, unable to decide whether previous courts had used 
a subject-based or method-based rationale—the court was obli-
gated to simply consider the case without any real guidance.110
                                                                                 
 109. Id. at 1011 (“[Prior cases] establish that Fourth Amendment protec-
tion is afforded to certain garages under certain circumstances, but they can-
not and do not control the answer to the question of whether this garage was 
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection under the circumstances of this 
case.”). 
  
 110. Id. 
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The Coffin decision should give pause. Given the ubiquity 
of attached garages, and the frequency of Fourth Amendment 
challenges, it strains belief that the Eleventh Circuit had not 
developed a clear rule for attached garages. Even more disturb-
ing is the apparent uselessness of the preexisting precedent. 
Although the facts of Coffin only narrowly distinguished it from 
the earlier cases—the primary difference was whether the inte-
rior door had been visible from the exterior of the garage—the 
Coffin court was unable to divine the rationales behind the ear-
lier decisions and was therefore unable to determine whether 
the slight factual distinction should also alter the outcome.111 
And rather than resolving the garage problem, Coffin perpetu-
ates it: its “totality of the circumstances” test provides perilous-
ly little assistance to any lower court unlucky enough to need 
guidance on the question.112
Kyllo creates a similar dilemma.
 Coffin provides strong evidence 
that Katz’s theoretical flaw has indeed manifested itself in the 
real world. 
113 The decision describes a 
multi-faceted privacy violation: it bases its holding on the ob-
servation of the interior of a private home, and the use of a 
heat-sensing device in the course of the investigation.114
The same problem manifests anytime a court decides a 
Fourth Amendment case using a “totality of the circumstances” 
test—or any time a court justifies an ambiguous Fourth 
Amendment holding by broad reference to Katz’s “reasonable 
expectations of privacy” test. If the constitutional protections 
are extended, uncertainty over which facts actually triggered 
them will prevent the creation of a strong precedent. If, howev-
er, the Fourth Amendment is not invoked, subsequent courts 
 Despite 
Justice Scalia’s extensive discussion of the facts, the Kyllo deci-
sion could be used to support three very different holdings: 
first, that the location of the search is determinative, and that 
the use of heat-sensing devices elsewhere is allowed; second, 
that the heat-sensing device is determinative, and less invasive 
means of observing a home are allowed; third, that neither are 
allowed, and the search created two separate Fourth Amend-
ment violations. 
                                                                                 
 111. Id. at 1010–11. 
 112. Id. at 1012. 
 113. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
 114. Id. (upholding a challenge to a search in which the “Government 
use[d] a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home 
that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion”).  
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can safely assume that none of the case’s factual elements are 
worthy of protection. 
3. The Cost of Katz’s Failure 
The inbuilt lopsidedness of Fourth Amendment precedent 
under Katz threatens privacy protections. First and foremost, it 
allows the same constitutional question to appear in front of a 
court multiple times without ever receiving a conclusive resolu-
tion. In fact, a court could theoretically address the same set of 
facts an indefinite number of times. But the first time a court 
finds that the facts do not implicate the Fourth Amendment, 
the question is resolved with finality. Those factual circum-
stances, standing alone, will never again carry the possibility of 
constitutional protection.  
Second, the structural asymmetry of the Katz test favors 
the government over private citizens. The model above predicts 
that, as the case law develops, the known set of variables that 
do not constrain government action will grow at a much faster 
rate than the set of variables that do constrain government ac-
tion. The government may eventually—if it has not already—
find itself at a marked advantage when determining what sort 
of searches it can safely conduct. On the other hand, to the ex-
tent that private citizens are relying on rules derived from 
Katz, they will not be able to point with much confidence to ar-
eas that are free from government intrusion, or types of surveil-
lance from which they are safe. 
Finally, the Katz test contains a subjective element: rea-
sonable expectations of privacy are not possible without subjec-
tive expectations of privacy.115 Concerns have been raised about 
the circularity of this requirement.116
                                                                                 
 115. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980) (requiring a 
defendant to show that he had a “legitimate expectation of privacy,” of which a 
subjective expectation of privacy is a prerequisite); Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]here is a twofold require-
ment, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy . . . .”). 
 If the government gives 
citizens no reason to expect privacy, does the Fourth Amend-
ment lose all its potency? The difficulty in identifying clear-cut 
Fourth Amendment protections adds a twist to this problem. 
An overview of Fourth Amendment case law reveals many are-
as that are categorically unprotected, and very few that are 
categorically protected. Depending on how strictly courts inter-
 116. See Rubenfeld, supra note 24, at 106 (“Commentators have long con-
demned the ‘reasonable expectations of privacy’ test as ineluctably circular.”). 
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pret the subjective requirement in the future, the struggle to 
build strong Fourth Amendment protections via case law could 
have a detrimental effect on the very scope of the Amendment 
itself.  
D. WHAT THE MODEL REVEALS 
In a way, the subject/method model only confirms what 
seems intuitively wrong about the Katz test from the very be-
ginning. It demonstrates that Katz has encouraged courts to re-
ly on a reliably fluid non-standard, and created a Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence that is as malleable as it is unpre-
dictable. Scholars have been making the same observation for 
decades, even without the help of fancy models like the one in 
this Note.117
But the subject/method model also reveals several other in-
teresting facts. First, it shows how Katz, as applied, is uniquely 
ill-suited to the construction of strong, privacy-oriented case 
precedent. Second, it suggests that, at times, Katz’s privacy 
language may just serve as a gloss. Judges applying Katz are 
required to look at the same facts as judges under any other 
Fourth Amendment regime. Third, it highlights the way in 
which analyzing search and seizure rules can become complex 
no matter what value or interest those rules ostensibly support. 
Intricate Fourth Amendment rules are not a product of Katz 
alone and could form almost as easily even if another case was 
governing search jurisprudence.  
 
Even at this point, one nagging criticism of the model re-
mains: what if it is incomplete? While the division between sub-
ject and method seems natural enough, has a logical basis, and 
often appears—both implicitly and explicitly—in Fourth 
Amendment cases, one might still envision a different taxono-
my for government searches. Perhaps, instead of method and 
subject, two other characteristics are chosen. Or perhaps a 
third characteristic is added, or even a fourth. (Two possible 
culprits: the party who conducted the search, and the crime 
that triggered the search.)118
                                                                                 
 117. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 
  
74, at 822 (“Katz is a Rorschach test. Its 
vague language can support a narrow or broad reading equally well.”). 
 118. Some basis for this idea is found in Jones, where the concurring Jus-
tices suggested that the crime being investigated might have some bearing on 
the constitutionality of warrantless GPS tracking. United States v. Jones, 132 
S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of longer term GPS 
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of pri-
vacy.” (emphasis added)). 
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Surprisingly, most of the analysis above would not change. 
Any system that describes searches as the combination of mu-
tually exclusive characteristics would create most of the prob-
lems this Note depicts. Indeed, the reasoning behind this con-
clusion would be almost perfectly analogous to the reasoning 
above. In short, no matter which components of a search one 
deems essential, the court’s current jurisprudence does a poor 
job of finding them and explaining them with any particularity. 
Instead, they remain hidden behind linguistic and conceptual 
fog.  
III.  THE WAY OUT   
The question posed, then, is whether there is any way to 
remedy the problems that plague Katz without completely 
abandoning the privacy interests that led the Supreme Court to 
overrule Olmstead and its property rights rationale. Do privacy 
and ambiguity go hand-in-hand? 
For some, the challenge of defining expectations of privacy 
has proven too daunting. Daniel Solove, for instance, recently 
argued that courts should abandon the Katz standard altogeth-
er.119 Instead of seeking to uphold expectations of privacy, he 
proposes that courts bar government searches that create “a 
problem of reasonable significance,” ignoring the hunt for first 
principles in favor of a totally pragmatic rule.120
There is, however, a middle ground. For all the chaos it has 
created, Katz’s central conceit—that the Fourth Amendment 
seeks to protect individual privacy and that Fourth Amend-
ment rules should be tailored to that end—is worth preserving. 
The defect in Katz lies not in its focus on privacy, but in its 
failure to articulate any means of weighing the privacy inter-
ests implicated by any given set of facts.  
 While this 
simplified approach has considerable merit, the confusion fol-
lowing Katz does not instill confidence in the ability of judges to 
reliably weigh and protect private interests in the absence of 
strict guidance.  
This flaw can be repaired by altering the way Fourth 
Amendment opinions are written. Most of the side effects of the 
Katz decision arise from the way it shields from scrutiny the 
true building blocks of a search: the passive subject and the ac-
tive method. These important components are removed from 
sight—but not from consideration—and it becomes very diffi-
                                                                                 
 119. Solove, supra note 14, at 1511–12.  
 120. Id. at 1514. 
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cult to find the foundations of any Fourth Amendment law. Ef-
forts to delve into the nuts and bolts of a search and seizure 
end not in enlightenment, but in a confusing miasma.  
The solution is for Fourth Amendment courts to reference 
these elements explicitly, and explain how they each relate to 
the holding. Directly connecting the subject and the method of 
a search to a Fourth Amendment rule would prevent infor-
mation from getting lost in interpretation. It would also place 
solid, proactive rules on the books, helping to cabin government 
invasions of privacy long before they reach a courtroom.121
The easiest way to do this would be to develop a universal, 
formulaic procedure for writing Fourth Amendment opinions. 
Each of the two elements of a search would be addressed in 
turn, and the privacy interests threatened by each would be 
discussed systematically. Judicial minimalism, appearing so of-
ten in search and seizure cases as “decisions on the facts,” 
would need to be abandoned. In its place, there would be an ev-
er-expanding catalogue of clearly identified subjects of search-
es, and clearly described search methods, each connected to a 
determination of constitutionality. Judges confronted with new 
facts could simply locate the closest analogues and conduct a 
straightforward comparison. Police officers, unsure of the prop-
er way forward, could do the same. And the private individual 
could finally know exactly what his government might be up to. 
  
Practically speaking, how could this shift occur? There are 
two broad possibilities: a top-down approach, and a bottom-up 
approach. The former is more complete, but far less likely. It 
would involve an explicit instruction from an appellate court—
ideally, the Supreme Court—to begin reframing Fourth 
Amendment decisions. Lower courts would be compelled to fo-
cus on the constituent elements of each decision, and reviewing 
courts would frown on “totality of the circumstances” tests. Of 
course, given the Supreme Court’s generally erratic course in 
the field of search and seizure, the odds of it adopting a highly 
structured new approach seem low.  
More gradual, but more plausible, is a bottom-up shift in 
the way Fourth Amendment decisions are written, driven most-
ly by lower courts’ interest in writing stronger, more compre-
                                                                                 
 121. Of course, as long as the test for warrantless searches allows for a sui 
generis holding limited to a particular set of facts, cases of first impression 
will generate some uncertainty. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
Nevertheless, addressing the underlying elements of a search will at least 
force judges to identify sui generis holdings as such, which may in turn limit 
their frequency. 
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hensible opinions. The recommendations provided above are 
not an all-or-nothing proposition. They can also be read as 
guidelines for writing clearer, more narrowly targeted, and 
more jurisprudentially robust Fourth Amendment holdings. 
Because the recommendations are about understanding the 
structure of searches and take no position on which set of prin-
ciples should be used to evaluate those searches, they can be 
safely used by any court without fear of contravening substan-
tive law. There are considerable incentives to adopt this new 
approach: any trial court or appeals court that takes these pro-
posals to heart should find its preferences easier to express in 
the present, and its precedent easier to follow in the future. If 
more and more of Fourth Amendment law were written accord-
ing to these guidelines, the end result would ultimately be 
much the same as if the change had been enacted by judicial 
fiat.  
This Note’s proposal is simultaneously broad in scope and 
conservative in nature. It is true that, if it were fully embraced, 
the proposal would necessarily affect virtually all warrantless 
search holdings. As many of the cases referenced by this Note 
demonstrate, judges today take a somewhat free-wheeling ap-
proach to answering Fourth Amendment questions. With so 
many lines of reasoning to choose from, and so many confusing 
standards and rules to follow, a judge confronting a Fourth 
Amendment problem often has considerable discretion. That 
discretion would be displaced by the more systematic approach 
suggested here. Writing Fourth Amendment decisions to for-
mula would greatly constrain the ability of judges to cut their 
own way through the nettle of search and seizure precedent. 
Instead, they would be encouraged to mechanically address a 
handful of fundamental questions about the parameters of the 
search.  
But in many ways, the change this proposal envisions is 
less fundamental than the changes envisioned by other pro-
posals to reorganize the Fourth Amendment.122
                                                                                 
 122. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 
 Unlike many 
competing approaches, it leaves untouched the current domi-
nant rationales for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—
whatever they may be. It does not force courts to devise logical-
ly consistent search protections, reject any extant line of Fourth 
Amendment case law, or alter the underlying interests protect-
ed by the current regime. Its strength is not dependent on its 
ability to parse out the “true” justification for any particular 
14, at 1514. 
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rule. Instead, the proposal accepts the Amendment’s tendency 
to produce a mass of overlapping rules and seeks only to cate-
gorize those rules so that they remain straightforward and ro-
bust. By limiting itself to the mechanics of Fourth Amendment 
decisions, it leaves judges free to devise their own policies—or 
follow preexisting ones—and merely counsels judges to change 
the way they talk about those rules.  
At the very least, reconciling judicial opinions with the 
basic conceptual structure of government searches would en-
courage a deeper understanding of the stakes in any given 
Fourth Amendment case. The current tendency to limit the 
scope of decisions by rooting them in the “totality of the circum-
stances” enables judges to resolve constitutional disputes with-
out ever addressing the broader issues posed by those dis-
putes.123 While there is nothing inherently wrong with 
approaching legal questions on a case-by-case basis, this prac-
tice, in the aggregate, has eroded privacy and created uncer-
tainty.124 Judges writing mechanistic decisions would be com-
pelled to abandon the “totality of the circumstances” test in 
favor of more nuanced deliberation, but otherwise, the judicial 
process would suffer only minimal disruption. After all, ques-
tions relating the subject and the method of a search are bound 
to occur in any Fourth Amendment case, regardless of whether 
they are explicitly acknowledged.125
  CONCLUSION   
 
  There is always something utopian about any proposal to 
change a body of law as large and ubiquitous as search and 
seizure. The Fourth Amendment has remained bewildering for 
many years, and there are few signs of immediate 
improvement. But eventually, the Katz standard and the 
Court’s current approach will need to be simplified, or 
something more rigid and reliable will need to be substituted in 
their place. As it stands, reading Fourth Amendment cases is 
often less about analysis than it is about divination. That is an 
unacceptable state of affairs for an area of law that represents 
some of the most basic, common interactions between people 
and their government.  
Fortunately, many of the problems with the law surround-
ing Fourth Amendment arise from identifiable and predictable 
                                                                                 
 123. See, e.g., Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1012 (11th Cir. 2011).  
 124. See supra Part II.C. 
 125. See supra Part II.B. 
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sources. The Katz test allows too much judicial discretion when 
deciding which searches to permit, and provides too little his-
torical guidance. In an unlucky historical accident, Katz prece-
dent creates structural pressure on attempts to limit the gov-
ernment’s ability to conduct searches. Judicial minimalism 
exacerbates both these trends. Social change has resulted in a 
hodgepodge of competing ideas about the Fourth Amendment. 
And potential reformers have several advantages. The fact 
patterns that make up Fourth Amendment cases are often sim-
ple variations on a theme, with most of the key elements recur-
ring time after time. Searches themselves take a universal bi-
nary form, and can always be divided into two components: 
subject and method. Although Fourth Amendment rules are 
tangled, they can be untangled with dedicated analysis.  
In the end, the simplest way to reorient the Fourth 
Amendment is to change the way we talk about it. Its complexi-
ties feed on the vagaries of the Katz test, so those vagaries 
should be rooted out. In their place courts should substitute a 
simple, universal vocabulary of search and seizure. We have al-
ready wasted far too much time trying to parse simple rules out 
of hazy reasoning. Whatever interests lie behind the Fourth 
Amendment—property, privacy, or something else—they’ll only 
be safe once we have got a search jurisprudence that is accessi-
ble and comprehensible.  
 
 
